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STUDENT NOTES
ACCEPTANCE OF DEEDS
In the recent case of Fitzpatrick v. Layne,' A, the owner of land,
was indebted to plaintiff, and wishing to secure the indebtedness, had
his attorney write a deed naming the plaintiff as grantee, and left the
deed with the attorney Just before his death, A got this deed and
destroyed it. Plaintiff did not know of the existence of the instru-
ment until after the death of A, whereupon plaintiff claimed the land
against A's executrix, contending there was a valid transfer. Held:
A's executrix keeps the land.
The Fitzpatrick case states the rule of delirery and acceptance
of deeds in Kentucky The court said, in part, "The acceptance of a
deed, like its delivery is a matter of intention, to-be deter-
mined by the acts and words, both of the grantor and grantee in
relation thereto."-
2
Kentucky follows the general rule as to delivery' which re-
quires an intention on the part of the grantor, plus some indication
that he is willing to part with title-whether this delivery be actual
or constructive-before there can be a valid conveyance.'
Kentucky does not follow the common law rule of acceptance. At
common law it is not necessary to show actual acceptance by the
grantee to make a deed effective, although the grantee may refuse to
accept the conveyance on learning about it2 This- rule is still in
effect in England,' and in a large number of states in this country
However, these states have added the further qualification that the
conveyance must be of benefit to the grantee before the presumption
of acceptance will arise6 In Kentucky a valid transfer requires
evidence of acceptance of the conveyance by the grantee with inten-
tion of retaining title in himself.'
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Thus we have three rules of acceptance:
1. The English rule-presumption of acceptance until dis-
claimed by grantee."
2. The majority rule in the United States-presumption of
acceptance if the conveyance is of benefit to the grantee.-
3. The minority rule in the United States (followed by
Kentucky)-no presumption of acceptance. The convey-
ance must be shown to have been accepted by the grantee
with intent to take title.
It may be pointed out that where the grantee is an infant, non
compos mentis, or a trustee," the states folloving the minority view
will presume acceptance if the transfer is beneficial to the grantee.
Also it had been held in California,'4 an adherent to the minority rule,
that the grantee may accept a deed after the death of the grantor
where the grantee had no knowledge of the deed before the grantor's
death. 5 In this respect the minority rule is similar to the majority"
Kentucky followed the minority rule and reached a desirable
conclusion in the case of Bell v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky," where
the rights of a third party were asserted after the grantor had de-
livered the instrument to the attorney of the grantee, but before the
grantee had accepted. The attorney had neither accepted as agent nor
informed the grantee that the instrument was in his hands. The
court refused to adhere to the legal fiction that upon the grantee's
acquiescence in the conveyance the acceptance reverts back to the
In the above cited cases, as well as in several others-Marler v
A. L. Greenburg Iron Co., 216 Ky 682, 288 S.W 674 (1926) Sullivan
v Sullivan, 179 Ky. 686, 201 S.W 24 (1918) the court talks about
acceptance being an essential part of delivery as if acceptance is merely
a subdivision of delivery Tiffany in his article on Delivery and
Acceptance of Deeds (1918) 17 Mich. L. Rev 103, objects to this. He
writes, "It is more satisfactory, conceding that acceptance is necessary,
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time of delivery, but construed acceptance as being at the exact
moment the grantee actually consented to the transfer. The court
deemed it essential for the purposes of justice that the actual time of
acceptance be considered as the beginning of ownership of the grantee.
Probably this same result is reached in the majority-rule states'
If the American rules were interpreted literally, injustice would
result in certain instances. However, the courts have shown a tendency
to integrate the two rulings in order to achieve justice in particular
cases, e.g., the minority holds like the majority in infant cases, and,
the majority holds like the minority where the rights of third parties
intervene. The two American views are sufficiently flexible to allow
a broad interpretation when justice demands. It would therefore
appear that there is little difference in many jurisdictions in the
application of these rules'
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THEORIES AS TO THE NATURE OF EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
The entire subject of equitable servitudes is somewhat con-
fused, most of the confusion probably arising because of a failure to
understand their nature. It is generally agreed that an equitable
servitude is a restriction on the use of land enforceable in equity
between contracting parties or their successors with notice. Their
development may be accredited to judicial legislation originating with
the English case of Tulk v. Moxhay.' The result in this case was ob-
tamed on the theory that the covenant should be enforced in order to
prevent unjust enrichment on the part of the purchaser who pre-
sumably had paid less for the property because of the servitude. This
rationalization has, however, been definitely repudiated.
Several other theories have been advanced by courts of equity
in enforcing such agreements. The two theories most often relied
upon by the courts are; first, such restrictions are enforceable as con-
tracts concerning the land;' and second, they are enforceable sub-
stantially as servitudes attached to the land
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